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Abstract
The epistemic analysis of solution concepts for dynamic games involves
statements about the players’ beliefs conditional upon diﬀerent histories
of play, their conditional beliefs about each other’s conditional beliefs, etc.
To represent such statements, we construct a space of inﬁnite (coherent)
hierarchies of conditional probability systems, deﬁned with respect to a
ﬁxed collection of relevant hypotheses concerning an external state (e.g.,
the strategy proﬁle being played.) As an application, we derive results
about common certainty of the opponent’s rationality conditional on an
arbitrary collection of histories in multistage games with observed actions
and (possibly) incomplete information.
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Introduction

A player’s strategy in an extensive-form game is a complete description of her
dispositions to act at diﬀerent information sets. In a symmetric fashion, the
analysis of rationality in extensive games relies (at least implicitly) on an equally
complete description of a player’s dispositions to hold beliefs about her opponents’ strategic choices.
We take the view that preserving this symmetry is just as natural and desirable in any treatment of the epistemic foundations of solution concepts for
extensive games.
Higher-order beliefs, i.e., beliefs about beliefs . . . , are key to the latter line
of research. Thus, two questions arise naturally. First, is it possible to model
players’ dispositions to hold hierarchical beliefs in a complete and consistent
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way? And, if so, can we make progress towards understanding some of the socalled “paradoxes” of extensive-form analysis by exploiting the expressive power
of such a model?
Our ﬁrst contribution answers the former question in the aﬃrmative. In
the standard, normal-form setting, it is well-known (see, e.g., Mertens and Zamir [19], Brandenburger and Dekel [10]) that, under fairly general conditions,
there exists a “universal” space of epistemic types. Its elements are sequences of
probability measures, corresponding to progressively higher-order beliefs. Thus,
essentially any (coherent) statement about players’ reciprocal beliefs has a representation in the universal space.
In this paper, we extend this type of construction by considering a space
whose elements are sequences of collections of (conditional) probabilities. In
particular, we consider collections which satisfy Bayes’ rule whenever possible,
so that our representation of agents’ dispositions to believe coincides with the
notion of a conditional probability system (or CPS), due to Alfred Renyi [26],1
and the elements of the “universal” space we construct are actually inﬁnite
hierarchies of CPSs.
We point out that, as in [19] and [10], our framework applies to more general
situations where a natural “basic” (or external) domain of uncertainty exists,
and agents hold interacting beliefs conditional on a ﬁxed collection of (relevant)
hypotheses about the prevailing external state.
As in the normal-form case, a single (coherent) hierarchical sequence of CPSs
may be regarded as an epistemic type — that is, a complete and explicit description of an agent’s conditional beliefs of arbitrary order. However, in the
spirit of Harsanyi [15], one may also list a set of epistemic types for each agent,
and associate with each type a CPS over the Cartesian product of the set of
external states and the collection of types listed for the other agents. Each type
thus deﬁned generates an inﬁnite hierarchy of CPSs; indeed, extending analogous results due to Mertens and Zamir [19], we show that every such implicit
description of a type space corresponds to a (beliefs-closed) subset of the space
of (coherent) hierarchies of CPSs, which can thus be rightfully deemed universal.
This is the second contribution of this paper.
We would like to suggest that the model we propose may be usefully employed to further our understanding of some of the puzzles and paradoxes of
extensive-form analysis. To support this claim, we provide a collection of results related to the notion of (conditional) common certainty of rationality in
two-player multistage games with observed actions and (possibly) incomplete
information.
Common knowledge or certainty of rationality are central ideas in the literature on the epistemic foundations of normal-form solution concepts (e.g., Tan
and Werlang [30]); they have also been employed in connection with extensive
games (e.g., Ben-Porath [7]), albeit often engendering much controversy (see,
for example, Aumann [1, 2], Binmore [9] and Reny [24] on backward induction.)
1 Myerson

[20] pioneered the use of CPSs in game theory.
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In an eﬀort to at least partially clarify some of the controversial issues involved, we propose a notion of common certainty of the opponent’s rationality
(CCOR) given an arbitrary collection of histories. Our deﬁnition formalizes the
following sequence of assumptions: for i = 1, 2 and j = i, (0.i) player i is rational, (1.i) player i is disposed to believe, after each history h in an arbitrarily
speciﬁed collection F, that (0.j) is true, (2.i) player i is disposed to believe,
after each history h ∈ F, that (1.j) is true, etc.
We show that, for any collection of histories F, these assumptions characterize an iterative elimination procedure which is reminiscent of rationalizability
(Bernheim [8], Pearce [22]), but incorporates stronger, extensive-form-motivated
restrictions. More speciﬁcally:
• In normal-form games, our procedure coincides with rationalizability; hence,
our results formally extend those of Tan and Werlang [30].
• In extensive-form games, if one takes the collection of relevant conditioning
events to be the (singleton) initial history, one obtains a characterization
of initial CCOR, as deﬁned and analyzed by Ben-Porath [7] in the more
restricted class of generic perfect information games.
• However, we can also characterize CCOR at any subsequent history. This
allows us to provide a simple and transparent answer to questions such as
whether or not there can be CCOR in the “Centipede” game if Player 1
does not choose “down” at the initial history.
• Finally, in our opinion, the most interesting and novel applications of
our result involves a non-singleton collection of conditioning events. For
instance:
– one may verify whether there can be CCOR conditional on the set
of histories comprising a given path of play;
– imposing CCOR given a collection of histories comprising a path
of play as well as select oﬀ-path histories may capture elements of
forward induction (see Example 1 in Section 5);
– using results due to Reny [24], we can show that, in generic perfect
information games, CCOR is possible given the collection R of all
histories that are (i) consistent with the rationality of both players,
and (ii) such that the player moving at an history h ∈ R does not
have a dominant action, if and only if every h ∈ R is on the backward
induction path.
We have already mentioned and brieﬂy discussed the literature more immediately related to the present paper. Other relevant contributions on the
foundations of (extensive form) game theory include Aumann [1, 2], Balkenborg
and Winter [3], Dekel and Gul [11], Samet [27] and Stalnaker [28, 29]. A more
detailed discussion of some of these papers will be deferred to the concluding
section.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the construction of
the (universal) space of inﬁnite hierarchies of CPSs. Section 3 discusses implicit
(and typically ﬁnite) representations of type spaces and relates the latter to the
universal space constructed in Section 2. Belief operators are the subject of
Section 4. All game-theoretic results, as well as illustrative examples, appear
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Some of the less instructive proofs
are collected in an appendix. Omitted proofs and examples of peripheral facts
mentioned in the paper are available upon request.2

2

Inﬁnite Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs

2.1

Conditional Probability Systems and Higher Order
Beliefs

For a given Polish (separable, and completely metrizable) space X, let A be the
Borel sigma-algebra on X and B ⊂ A a non-empty, ﬁnite or countable collection
such that ∅ ∈
/ B and each B ∈ B is both closed and open. The interpretation
is that a certain individual i is uncertain about the “true” element x ∈ X,
and B represents a collection of observable events, or “relevant hypotheses.” In
particular, we will mostly be interested in the following situation: there is a set
Σ of basic “external” states, and a set Z consisting of (some representation)
of another individual’s beliefs about Σ; then each point (state) in the set X =
Σ × Z provides a description of “external” as well as “epistemic” features of the
situation at hand. In a game, this could comprise a description of the strategy
proﬁle being played, and a representation of the beliefs held by individual i’s
opponent. The set B could consist of hypotheses concerning the “external” state
only, i.e., sets of the form B × Z for B ⊂ Σ; as long as the latter is ﬁnite, the
elements of B will be guaranteed to be both closed and open.3
For a diﬀerent example, X may be the set of sample paths in a repeated
experiment with ﬁnitely many outcomes, or the set of complete histories in a
supergame with a ﬁnite stage game, while elements of B may be equivalence
classes of histories sharing a common initial subhistory. In this case, too, the
conditioning events may be shown to be both closed and open.
A conditional probability system (or CPS) on (X, A, B) is a mapping
µ(·|·) : A × B → [0, 1]
satisfying the following axioms:
Axiom 1. For all B ∈ B, µ(B|B) = 1.
Axiom 2. For all B ∈ B, µ(·|B) is a probability measure on (X, A).
2 They
3 This

are also available in electronic format at http://www.princeton.edu/∼marciano.
fact is used in the proof of Lemma 1.
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Axiom 3. For all A ∈ A, B, C ∈ B, if A ⊂ B ⊂ C then µ(A|B)µ(B|C) =
µ(A|C).4
The set of probability measures on (X, A) is denoted by ∆(X); the set of
conditional probability systems on (X, A, B) can be regarded as a subset of
B
[∆(X)] (the set of mappings from B to ∆(X)) and it is denoted by ∆B (X).
Accordingly, we often write µ = (µ(·|B))B∈B ∈ ∆B (X). The topology on X and
A (the smallest sigma-algebra containing this topology) are always understood
and need not be explicit in our notation. Thus we simply say “conditional
probability system (or CPS) on (X, B).”
We regard ∆B (X) as the space of possible conditional beliefs of an individual,
say j, and we wish to deﬁne the higher order beliefs of another individual i about
the beliefs of j. We argue below that it is conceptually appropriate to deﬁne
such higher order beliefs over the Borel sigma-algebra generated by the product
topology of weak convergence of measures.
Fix a Borel set A, a relevant hypothesis B and a real number p ∈ [0, 1]. The
informal statement, “conditional on B, individual j would assign probability at
p
(A) ≡ {µ ∈ ∆B (X) : µ(A|B) ≥ p} ⊂
least p to A” corresponds to the set βB
B
∆ (X).
In order to formalize more complex statements such as, “conditional on
C ∈ B, i would assign a subjective conditional probability to the event ‘j would
assign probability at least p to A conditional on B’ ”, we must endow ∆B (X)
p
(A), for all Borel-measurable A ⊂ X,
with a sigma-algebra including all sets βB
B ∈ B and p ∈ [0, 1]. It is then natural to consider the sigma-algebra generated
by such sets, which we denote by A+1 (cf. Heifetz and Samet [17].)
It turns out that, since X is assumed to be a Polish space, the rather intuitive measure-theoretic structure just described is entirely consistent with a
particularly convenient topological structure on the set of conditional probability systems.
More speciﬁcally, endow ∆(X) with the topology of weak convergence of
B
measures, and [∆(X)] with the product topology. Consider the Borel sigmaB
algebra on [∆(X)] . Lemma 1 below states that ∆B (X) is a closed subset
B
of [∆(X)] . Thus the collection of Borel subsets of ∆B (X) is the Borel sigmaB
algebra of ∆B (X) viewed as a topological subspace of [∆(X)] . This Borel (sub–
) sigma-algebra is precisely the “natural” sigma-algebra A+1 deﬁned above.5
4 The tuple (X, A, B, µ) is called conditional probability space by Rènyi [26]. When X is
ﬁnite, A = 2X , B = 2X \{∅}, we obtain Myerson’s [20] conditional probability systems.
5 Since X is a Polish space every probability measure in ∆(X) is regular. Therefore the Borel
sigma-algebra on the topological space ∆(X) coincides with the sigma-algrebra generated by
the base of subsets β p (A) = {m ∈ ∆(X) : m(A) ≥ p}, A measurable, p ∈ [0, 1] (see, e.g.,
Kechris [18], Theorem 17.24.) Since ∆(X) is Polish, it is second countable. Therefore the
product sigma-algebra on [∆(X)]B coincides with the Borel sigma-algebra generated by the
product topology (e.g., Kechris [18], p. 68.) This implies the result stated above. Similar
arguments justify deﬁning higher order beliefs on Borel sigma algebras in other papers on
hierarchies of beliefs where the set of external states has a “nice” topological structure. (Kim
Border and Aviad Heifetz kindly provided the relevant mathematical references.)
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Lemma 1. The set ∆B (X) of conditional probability systems on (X, B) is a
B
closed subset of [∆(X)] . Therefore ∆B (X) (endowed with the relative topology
B
inherited from [∆(X)] ) and X × ∆B (X) (endowed with the product topology)
6
are Polish spaces.
Proof: See the Appendix.
+1

Let X +1 = X × ∆B (X) and let C : A → 2X be deﬁned by C(A) = A ×
B
∆ (X). Thus C(B) = {C ⊂ X : ∃B ∈ B, C = B ×∆B (X)} is a set of “cylinders”
generated by B and represents a copy of B in X +1 . Then we can deﬁne the set
of “second order” CPSs ∆C(B) (X +1 ). Since X +1 is a Polish space, it follows
from Lemma 1 that also ∆C(B) (X +1 ) (endowed with the appropriate topology
∈ ∆C(B) (X) is a countable
as above) is a Polish space. Each element µ+1
i
collection of individual i’s conditional joint beliefs about the true value of x ∈ X
and µj ∈ ∆B (X) — individual j’s conditional beliefs about x ∈ X, — whereby
the conditioning events, or hypotheses, are essentially the same as in B.

B
Note that ∆C(B) (X +1 ) can be regarded as a subset of ∆(X +1 ) . Thus,
we are somewhat justiﬁed in adopting the simpler notation ∆B (X +1 ) whenever
the precise structure of the conditioning events is clear from the context and/or
need not be speciﬁed, even though B is not a collection of subsets of X +1 . More
generally, let Y = X × Z, B ⊂ 2X , BY = {C ⊂ Y : ∃B ∈ B, C = B × Z}; then
the set of CPSs on (Y, BY ) will be equivalently denoted by ∆BY (Y ) or ∆B (Y ).
Finally, for any probability measure ν on the product space Y = X × Z let
mrgX ν ∈ ∆(X) denote the marginal measure on X. In what follows it is useful
to note that, if µ = (µ(·|B × Z))B∈B ∈ ∆B (Y ), then (mrgX µ(·|B × Z))B∈B ∈
∆B (X).

2.2

Inductive Construction

We are now ready for the inductive construction of the space of inﬁnite hierarchies of conditional beliefs and the universal type space. For the sake of
simplicity, we assume that there are only two individuals i and j sharing a common space Σ of external states (about which they are uncertain) and a common
collection of relevant hypotheses B. The individuals have conditional beliefs
about Σ and about each other for every hypothesis B ∈ B. However, we do
not explicitly represent the beliefs of an individual about her own beliefs. The
implicit assumption is that an individual always assigns probability one to her
true beliefs. As before we assume that Σ is a Polish space and B is a ﬁnite or
countable collection of its non-empty subsets which are both closed and open.
Deﬁne recursively X n and B n as follows:
X 0 = Σ, B 0 = B;
for all n ≥ 0,
n
X n+1 = C(X n ) := X n × ∆B (X n ),
n
B n+1 = C(B n ) := {C ⊂ X n+1 : ∃B ∈ B n , C = B × ∆B (X n )}.
6 If

some B ∈ B is either non-open or non-closed, ∆B (X) may fail to be closed.
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An element µn+1 ∈ ∆B (X n ) is an (n + 1)th -order CPS with elements
(·|B) ∈ ∆(X n ), B ∈ B n . It can be easily veriﬁed that in our notation
µ
n+1

n

∆B (X n ) = ∆B (X n ), X n+1 = Σ ×

k=n


∆B (X k .)

k=0

∞

The set of inﬁnite hierarchies of CPSs is H = n=0 ∆B (X n ). An inﬁnite
hierarchy represents an epistemic type and is therefore typically denoted by
t = (µ1 , µ2 , ..., µn , ...). Lemma 1 implies that for all n ≥ 0, X n and ∆B (X n ) are
Polish spaces. It follows that also H and ∆B (Σ × H) are Polish spaces. Note
also that for all k ≥ 0, Σ × H can be decomposed as follows:
Σ × H = Xk ×

∞


∆B (X n ).

n=k

2.3

Coherent Hierarchies

We have not yet imposed any coherency condition relating beliefs of diﬀerent
order. Of course, we want to assume that, conditional on any relevant hypothesis, beliefs of diﬀerent order assign the same probability to the same event. For
all integers k ≥ 0, n ≥ 1 and subsets A ⊂ X k let C n (A) denote the subset of
X k+n corresponding to A, that is,
C n (A) = A ×

m=k+n−1


∆B (X m ).

m=k

Note that, as the notation suggests, C(C n−1 (A)) = C n (A). Similarly, C ∞ (A) is
the subset of Σ × H corresponding to A (replace n and k + n − 1 with ∞ in the
formula above.) In particular, for any B ∈ B, C n (B) (or C ∞ (B)) is the subset
of X n (or Σ × H) corresponding to B. Recall that, for any probability measure
ν on a product space X × Z, mrgX ν ∈ ∆(X) denotes the marginal measure on
X.
Deﬁnition 1. An inﬁnite hierarchy of CPS’s t = (µ1 , µ2 , ..., µn , ...) is coherent
if for all B ∈ B, n = 1, 2, ...,
mrgX n−1 µn+1 (·|C n (B)) = µn (·|C n−1 (B)).

(1)

The set of coherent hierarchies is denoted by Hc .
The following proposition establishes that we can equivalently describe events
concerning the conditional beliefs of a coherent individual i as (measurable)
subsets of coherent hierarchies of conditional beliefs or (measurable) subsets of
conditional beliefs about the external state and the (coherent or incoherent)
inﬁnite hierarchy of individual j.
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Proposition 1. (cf. [10], Proposition 1) There exists a “canonical” homeomorphism f : Hc → ∆B (Σ × H) such that if µ = f (µ1 , µ2 , ..., µn , ...), then for
all B ∈ B, n = 1, 2, ...,
mrgX n−1 µ(·|C ∞ (B)) = µn (·|C n−1 (B)).

(2)

We ﬁrst prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Consider the following set:


D = (δ 1 , δ 2 , ...) : ∀n ≥ 1, δ n ∈ ∆(X n−1 ), mrgX n−1 δ n+1 = δ n .
There is a homeomorphism h : D → ∆(Σ × H) such that
∀n ≥ 1, mrgX n−1 h(δ 1 , δ 2 , ...) = δ n .
Proof: Let Z 0 = X 0 = Σ, ∀n ≥ 1, Z n = ∆B (X n−1 ). Each Z n is a Polish
space and


D = (δ 1 , δ 2 , ...) : ∀n ≥ 1, δ n ∈ ∆(Z 0 × ... × Z n−1 ), mrgX n−1 δ n+1 = δ n .
The result then follows from Lemma 1 in [10].
Proof of Proof of Proposition 1: For each B ∈ B, let πB : Hc → D be the
following projection function:


πB (µ1 , ..., µn , ...) = µ1 (· | B), ..., µn (· | C n−1 (B), ... .
πB is clearly continuous. By Lemma 2 the mapping
fB = h ◦ πB : Hc → ∆(Σ × H)
is also continuous. Let µ(· | C ∞ (B)) = fB (µ1 , µ2 , ...). Clearly, µ(C ∞ (B) |
C ∞ (B)) = 1 and for all n = 1, 2, ..., eq. (2) is satisﬁed. Thus the mapping
B

f = (fB )B∈B : Hc → [∆(Σ × H)]

is continuous and satisﬁes eq. (2). The latter fact implies that f is 1 − 1
and the restriction of f −1 to f (Hc ) is continuous. We only have to show that
f (Hc ) = ∆B (Σ × H).

∆B (Σ × H) ⊂ f (Hc ) . Take µ ∈ ∆B (Σ×H) and for all B ∈ B, n ≥ 1 deﬁne
µn (·|C n (B)) using eq. (2). If t = (µ1 , ..., µn , ...) ∈ Hc , then f (t) = µ ∈ f (Hc ).
Thus it is suﬃcient to show that t = (µ1 , ..., µn , ...) ∈ Hc ; in order to do this we
only have to verify that each µn satisﬁes Axiom 3 (coherency of t is satisﬁed by
construction.) For each n, let An ⊂ X n be measurable, B, C ∈ B and suppose
that An ⊂ C n (B) ⊂ C n (C) (thus B ⊂ C.) Since Σ × H is a (countable) product
of second-countable spaces, the Borel sigma-algebra generated by the product
topology coincides with the (product) sigma-algebra generated by cylinders with
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ﬁnitely many nontrivial7 factors (see Kechris [18], p. 68.), so in particular
C ∞ (An ) is measurable. Also, C ∞ (An ) ⊂ C ∞ (B) ⊂ C ∞ (C). Thus we can use
Axiom 3 for µ and eq. (2) to show that µn+1 (An |C n (B))µn+1 (C n (B)|C n (C)) =
n n
µn+1

 (A |C (C)).
f (Hc ) ⊂ ∆B (Σ × H) . Take t = (µ1 , ..., µn , ...) ∈ Hc and let µ = f (t). We
must verify that Axiom 3 holds for µ. Choose B, C ∈ B such that B ⊂ C
and n ≥ 0. Consider a set An ⊂ X n , measurable in the Borel sigma-algebra
generated by the product topology on X n . Applying Axiom 3 to µn+1 for all
n = 0, 1, ..., we obtain
µn+1 (An |C n (B))µn+1 (C n (B)|C n (C)) = µn+1 (An |C n (C)).
Then eq. (2) yields
µ(C ∞ (An )|C ∞ (B))µ(C ∞ (B)|C ∞ (C)) = µ(C ∞ (An )|C ∞ (C))
This implies that µ satisﬁes Axiom 3 on the collection C<∞ of cylinders, i.e.,
Cartesian products of measurable sets of which at most ﬁnitely many are nontrivial. Again, since each factor space in the Cartesian product Σ×Πn≥0 ∆B (X n )
is second-countable, C<∞ generates A, the sigma-algebra generated by the
product topology.
Now let B(B, C) ⊂ A be the collection of measurable sets for which Axiom 3
holds for ﬁxed B, C ∈ B. By sigma-additivity of µ, B(B, C) is a monotone class,
and it contains the algebra C<∞ . Hence the smallest monotone class containing
C<∞ is also a sigma-algebra, which cannot be smaller than the sigma–algebra
generated by C<∞ , i.e., A. Also, it must be contained in B(B, C), which completes the proof.

2.4

Common Certainty of Coherency

Even if i’s hierarchy of CPSs ti is coherent, some elements of f (ti ) (i.e., some
fB (ti ), B ∈ B) may assign positive probability to sets of incoherent hierarchies
of the other individual j. We now consider the case in which there is common
certainty of coherency conditional on every B ∈ B. Observe that B is a collection of “external” events; conditioning on any B ∈ B does not restrict each
individual’s beliefs about each other’s beliefs — only her beliefs about the prevailing external state. In particular, no event in B conveys information about
an individual’s coherency. It follows that there cannot be any inconsistency
in assuming that there is common certainty of coherency conditional on any
B ∈ B: that is, we do not run the risk of formally requiring that an individual
be (conditionally) certain of something that must necessarily be false, given the
relevant conditional.
Formally, we shall say that individual i, endowed with a coherent hierarchy
of CPSs ti , is certain of some (measurable) event E ⊂ Σ × H given B ∈ B if
7 That

is, strictly included in the corresponding factor space.
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fB (ti )(E) = 1. Common certainty of coherency given every B ∈ B can thus be
inductively deﬁned as follows:
Hc1 = Hc ,
for all k ≥ 2,
Hck = {t ∈ Hck−1 : ∀B ∈ B, fB (t)(Σ × Hck−1 ) = 1},
T = k≥1 Hck .
T × T is the set of pairs of hierarchies satisfying common certainty of coherency conditional on every relevant hypothesis.
Proposition 2. (cf. [10], Proposition 2) The restriction of f = (fB )B∈B to
T ⊂ Hc induces an homeomorphism g = (gB )B∈B : T → ∆B (Σ × T ) (deﬁned by
gB (t)(E) = fB (t)(E) for all B ∈ B, t ∈ T , E ⊂ Σ × T measurable.)
Proof: First note that T = {t ∈ Hc : ∀B ∈ B, fB (t)(B × T ) = 1}. In
fact, let t ∈ Hc and suppose that, for all B ∈ B, fB (t)(Σ × T ) = 1. Then
t ∈ k≥1 Hck = T . Conversely, for each t ∈ T , B ∈ B and k, fB (t)(Σ × Hck ) = 1.
Since the measure fB (t) is sigma-additive



fB (t)(Σ × T ) = fB (t) Σ × 
k≥1

Hck  = lim fB (t)(Σ × Hck ) = 1.
k→∞

It follows that f (T ) = {µ ∈ ∆B (Σ × H) : ∀B ∈ B, µ(B × T |B × H) = 1}, T is
homeomorphic to f (T ), and each fB (T ) is homeomorphic to ∆(B × T ). Given
the deﬁnition of g in terms of f , one can check that for all t ∈ T , g(t) satisﬁes
Axioms 1, 2 and 3, and thus g is a homeomorphism between T and ∆B (Σ×T ).
Proposition 2 shows that each element t ∈ T corresponds to an epistemic
type in the usual sense, except that here a type is uniquely associated with a conditional probability system on (Σ × T, B) instead of a single probability measure
on Σ × T . Thus an epistemic type ti ∈ T represents the beliefs that individual
i would have about the external state and about individual j’s epistemic type
conditional on every relevant hypothesis B ∈ B.
The construction carried out above (in particular, Lemma 2) exploits the
topological structure of the sets X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X n , . . . . We conjecture that an alternative “topology-free” construction à la Heifetz and Samet [17] is possible in
the present context. The resulting set of epistemic types T̃ could then be shown
to be equivalent to the set of CPSs on Σ × T̃ , up to a measurable isomorphism
(as opposed to “up to a homeomorphism.”) However, the topological structure
additionally enables one to associate closeness of epistemic types with closeness
of beliefs — and conclude, for instance, that an individual’s best reply correspondence is upper semi-continuous as a (composite) function of her type. It
also enables one to conclude that, if a (coarse) subset of T approximates a ﬁner
subset of epistemic types, the same holds true for the corresponding subsets of
beliefs (see, e.g., Mertens and Zamir [19].)
Thus, introducing a topological structure in the analysis allows one to derive
a richer theory. Moreover, as was argued above, it can be done without prejudice
to the “natural” measure-theoretic structure on the space of beliefs.
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Type Spaces

Each element t = (µ1 , µ2 , . . .) of the set T deﬁned in the previous Section is by
construction a complete list of an individual’s hierarchical beliefs. That is, each
t ∈ T provides an “explicit” representation of the individual’s epistemic type.
Alternatively, one may choose to start with an “implicit” representation,
which closely mimics Harsanyi’s original formulation of incomplete information
games (see [15] and Mertens and Zamir [19]; for extensive games, see also BenPorath [7].)
Deﬁnition 2. A type space on (Σ, B) is a tuple T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) such
that for each i = 1, 2, Ti is a Polish space and gi is a continuous function
gi = (gi,B )B∈B : Ti → ∆B (Σ × Tj ),
where i = j.
There are obvious parallels between the deﬁnition of a type space and Proposition 2.8
Remark 1. By Proposition 2, if we set T1 = T2 = T and g1 = g2 = g we obtain
a (symmetric) type space which is denoted by T u .
Moreover, given a type space T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) on (Σ, B), it is possible
to associate to every “implicit” description ti ∈ Ti an “explicit” hierarchy of
beliefs, i.e., a point in the set H constructed in the previous Section. A canonical
procedure, which we presently illustrate, achieves this.

3.1

From Implicit to Explicit Representation

The following notation is essential. For any given measurable function ϕ−i :

ϕ−i,B )B∈B : ∆B (Σ × Tj ) → ∆B (Σ × Tj ) be the
Σ × Tj → Σ × Tj , let ϕ
−i = (
corresponding function associating to each CPS µi on (Σ × Tj , B) the induced

B

CPS µi = ϕ
−i (µi ) on (Σ × Tj , B). More speciﬁcally, for all µi ∈ ∆ (Σ × Tj ),


A ⊂ Σ × T (measurable), B ∈ B,

−1
ϕ

(A )|B × Tj ).
−i,B (µi )(A ) = µi ((ϕ−i )

Our objective is to construct a pair of functions (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) associating to each
hierarchy of CPSs ti = ϕi (τi ) ∈ H. The mappings
type τi ∈ Ti a corresponding


ϕi = ϕ1i , ϕ2i , ... = (ϕ1i,B )B∈B , (ϕ2i,B )B∈B , ... , i = 1, 2 are obtained with a
canonical inductive construction: the ﬁrst order beliefs ϕ1i (τi ) are derived by
marginalization on Σ; the second order beliefs ϕ2i (τi ) are obtained using gj and
ϕ1j , and so on. More precisely:
8 Note however that the maps g in the deﬁnition of a type space are not required to be
i
homeomorphisms.
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• (1) For each i = 1, 2, τi ∈ Ti , B ∈ B,
ϕ1i,B (τi ) = mrgΣ gi,B (τi ).
For each i, j = 1, 2, i = j, τj ∈ Tj , σ ∈ Σ,
1
(σ, τj ) = (σ, ϕ1j (τj )),
ψ−i
1
= (IdΣ , ϕ1j ) (IdΣ is the identity function on Σ.) Thus we
that is, ψ−i
1
1
have ϕi : Ti → ∆B (X 0 ) and ψ−i
: Σ × Tj → X 1 (recall that X 0 = Σ and
n+1
n
B
n
= X × ∆ (X ).)
X
n
• (n+1, n≥1) Let ϕni : Ti → ∆B (X n−1 ) and ψ−i
: Σ × Tj → X n (i, j = 1, 2,
i = j) be given. For each i = 1, 2, τi ∈ Ti , B ∈ B, An ⊂ X n (measurable),
 n −1 n 
n
(A ) ,
ϕn+1
i,B (τi )(A ) = gi,B (τi ) (ψ−i )
n

=ψ
that is, ϕn+1
i
−i ◦ gi . For each i, j = 1, 2, i = j, τj ∈ Tj , σ ∈ Σ,
 n

n+1
(σ, τj ) = ψ−i
(σ, τj ), ϕn+1
(τj ) ,
ψ−i
j
n+1
n
that is, ψ−i
= (ψ−i
, ϕn+1
). Thus we have ϕn+1
: Ti → ∆B (X n ) and
j
i
n+1
ψ−i
: Σ × Tj → X n+1 .


n+1
Note that ψ−i
(σ, τj ) = σ, ϕ1j (τj ), ..., ϕnj (τj ), ϕn+1
(τj ) .
j
This completes the inductive step.

3.2

Type-Morphisms and Universality

The preceding construction shows that, for any type space T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ),
there exists a canonical embedding of each Ti in H. This subsection addresses
the question whether the sets Ti can actually be embedded in T , the collection
of inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs satisfying coherency and common certainty of
coherency conditional on every hypothesis. If this is the case, then any type
space may essentially be regarded as a (belief-closed) subspace of the symmetric
type space T u .
In order to formalize these ideas, we need to develop an adequate notion
of embedding for type spaces. The central ingredient is again the map ϕ

−i :
∆B (Σ × Tj ) → ∆B (Σ × Tj ) induced by a continuous function ϕ−i : Σ × Tj →
Σ × Tj , where Tj and Tj are sets of epistemic types.
Deﬁnition 3. Let T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) and T  = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) be two
type spaces on (Σ, B). A type-morphism from T to T  is a triple of functions
ϕ = (ϕ0 , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) whereby ϕ0 is the identity function on Σ and for each i = 1, 2,
ϕi : Ti → Ti is a continuous function such that

gi ◦ ϕi = ϕ
−i ◦ gi
(where ϕ−i = (ϕ0 , ϕj ) : Σ × Tj → Σ × Tj .) If ϕ is a homeomorphism between
Σ × T1 × T2 and Σ × T1 × T2 , then we say that T and T  are isomorphic.
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The intuition is as follows. Fix a type ti ∈ Ti ; the function ϕi maps ti to
some ti ∈ Ti , and gi (ti ) then retrieves a CPS µ on Σ × Tj . Alternatively, one
can use the function gi to obtain from ti a CPS ν on Σ × Tj , then ϕ

−i to map
ν to a CPS ν  on Σ × Tj . Intuitively, µ and ν  should coincide, because both
originate from the same epistemic type ti ∈ Ti . Equivalently, the embedding
B
B

ϕi : Ti → Ti and the (derived) embedding ϕ

−i : ∆ (Σ × Tj ) → ∆ (Σ × Tj )
should be consistent with each other. This is precisely what the above deﬁnition
requires.
Type-morphisms satisfy an intuitively appealing closure property:
Remark 2. Let let ϕ = (ϕ0 , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) be a type-morphism between the type spaces
T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) and T  = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) on (Σ, B). Then
∀i = 1, 2, ∀τi ∈ ϕi (Ti ), ∀B ∈ B :


gi,B
(τi )(Σ × ϕj (Tj )) = 1

That is, Σ × ϕ1 (T1 ) × ϕ2 (T2 ) is a belief-closed subset of Σ × T1 × T2 .
This property is consistent with the proposed interpretation of type-morphisms
as a way to view one type space as a subset of another (up to renaming and
deletion of redundant types.)
Another useful (and natural) property of type-morphisms follows.
Remark 3. Suppose ϕ is a type-morphism from T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) to
T  = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) let E ⊂ Σ×T1 ×T2 and E  ⊂ Σ×T1 ×T2 be measurable
subsets such that ϕ(E) ⊂ E  . Then for all i ∈ {1, 2}, τi ∈ Ti , B ∈ B,
gi,B (τi ) ({(σ, τj ) : (σ, τi , τj ) ∈ E}) ≤



gi,B
(ϕ(τi )) (σ, τj ) : τj = ϕj (τj ), ϕ(σ, τi , τj ) ∈ E  .
We are ﬁnally able to tackle the issue of “universality”.9
The formal deﬁnition of this property should be by now entirely transparent:
Deﬁnition 4. A type space T  on (Σ, B) is universal if for every other type
space T on (Σ, B) there is unique type-morphism from T to T  .
Remark 4. Any two universal type spaces are isomorphic.
We are ready to state the main result of this Section.
Proposition 3. Let T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) be an arbitrary type space on
(Σ, B) and, for i = 1, 2, let ϕi : Ti → H be the functions deﬁned in Subsection
3.1. Then, for each i = 1, 2, ϕi (Ti ) ⊂ T and ϕ = (IdΣ , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) is the unique
type-morphism from T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) to T u = (Σ, B, T, T, g, g). Thus
T u is the unique universal type space (up to isomorphisms.)
Proof: See the Appendix.
9 See Mertens and Zamir [19] and Heifetz and Samet [17, 16]. Heifetz and Samet show that,
if we drop the topological structure, the space of hierarchies of beliefs (satisfying coherency
and common certainty of coherency) is “larger” than the set of hierarchies generated by some
type space. The latter is a universal type space.
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Independence

As was suggested above, the set Σ represents a collection of possible external
states which are relevant to the individuals’ decision problems. Apart from
certain topological properties, the construction of the universal type space T u
and the deﬁnition of a type space do not require that Σ exhibit any particular
structure. However, in game-theoretic applications, Σ is the Cartesian product
of the two players’ strategy spaces10 . Thus, we may wish to require that an individual’s conditional beliefs satisfy a (weak) form of independence: informally,
her beliefs about her own strategy should be separable from her beliefs about
her opponent’s strategy and epistemic type.
In general, suppose that Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 , where each Σi , i = 1, 2, is a Polish
space. Derive from B two collections B1 , B2 of marginal conditioning events as
follows:
B1 = {B1 ⊂ Σ1 : ∃B2 ⊂ Σ2 , ∃B ∈ B, B = B1 × B2 },
B2 is similarly deﬁned. Note that each Bi is a ﬁnite or countable collection of
subsets which are both closed and open. Finally, suppose that
B ⊂ {B ⊂ Σ : ∃B1 ∈ B1 , B2 ∈ B2 such that B = B1 × B2 }

(3)

For any i = 1, 2, the set of CPSs on Σi and Σi × Ti will be denoted by
∆Bi (Σi ) and ∆Bi (Σi × Ti ) respectively.
Deﬁnition 5. Fix a type space T = (Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 , B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) satisfying 3.
Player i’s CPS µi ∈ ∆B (Σ1 × Σ2 × T2 ) has the independence property if there
are two CPSs µii ∈ ∆Bi (Σi ) and µij ∈ ∆Bj (Σj × Tj ) such that for all B = B1 ×
B2 ∈ B,
µi (·|B1 × B2 × Tj ) = µii (·|Bi ) ⊗ µij (·|Bj × Tj ),
where ⊗ denotes the product of measures.
The set of CPSs for player i with the independence property is denoted by
I∆B (Σi , Σj × Tj ). Similarly, the set of CPSs on Σ satisfying the independence
property is denoted I∆B (Σi , Σj ). Note that for all µi ∈ I∆B (Σi , Σj × Tj ) the
CPSs µii and µij mentioned in Deﬁnition 5 are uniquely determined. We call
µii and µij the marginals of µi on Σi and Σj × Tj respectively.
As one should expect, type-morphisms preserve the independence property:
Lemma 3. Suppose that Σ = Σ1 × Σ2 and B satisﬁes 3. Fix two type spaces
T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) and T  = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) on (Σ, B) and a typemorphism ϕ = (ϕ0 , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) between T and T  . For all i = 1, 2, ti ∈ Ti ,
gi (ti ) ∈ I∆B (Σi , Σj × Tj )

⇒

gi (ϕi (ti )) ∈ I∆B (Σi , Σj × Tj )

Proof : Omitted.
10 Or, for incomplete-information games, the Cartesian product of the players’ sets of strategy — payoﬀ type pairs: see Section 5 for details.
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Conditional Belief Operators

Fix an arbitrary type space T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ). A point (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈
Σ × T1 × T2 comprises a description of the external state σ, and (perhaps via the
canonical maps ϕi : Ti → T ) a complete list of both individuals’ hierarchical
beliefs. Thus, we refer to any such point as a state of the world ; similarly,
measurable sets E ⊂ Σ × T1 × T2 will be called events.
The next order of business is to deﬁne the notions of probability p belief and
certainty (i.e., probability one belief.)
For each τi ∈ Ti , Eτi ⊂ Σ × Tj denotes the set of pairs (σ, τj ) consistent with
the event E and the epistemic type τi (Eτ1 = {(σ, τ2 ) ∈ Σ × T2 : (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ E},
Eτ2 is similarly deﬁned.) Type τi assigns to E a probability of at least p
conditional on each hypothesis B ∈ F ⊂ B if ∀B ∈ F, gi,B (τi )(Eτi ) ≥ p. Note
that we are implicitly assuming that i is certain of her epistemic type. For every
/ F ⊂ B, the event “i
E ⊂ Σ × T1 × T2 and collection of relevant hypotheses ∅ ∈
would be certain of E conditional on every B ∈ F” is
βi,F (E) := {(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) : ∀B ∈ F, gi,B (τi )(Eτi ) = 1}
(note that βi,F (E) is measurable for each (measurable) E.) If F is a singleton,
we replace it with its unique element as a subscript. If we have to emphasize
the type space T , we add T as a subscript to the belief operators, that is, we
write βi,F ,T (E).
It is easily shown that each βi,F has all the standard properties of belief
operators.11 In particular, each βi,F satisﬁes:
• Monotonicity: E ⊂ F implies βi,F (E) ⊂ βi,F (F ),
• Conjunction: βi,F (E ∩ F ) = βi,F (E) ∩ βi,F (F ).
In the following, we will often consider events pertaining to the realization of
the external state and the individuals’ ﬁrst-order beliefs about Σ; we presently
develop the required notation and note a related property of type morphisms.
Let E ⊂ Σ × ∆B (Σ) × ∆B (Σ) be measurable. The event corresponding to
subset E in type space T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) is denoted ET , i.e.,




ET := (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) : σ, (mrgΣ g1,B (τ1 ))B∈B , (mrgΣ g2,B (τ2 ))B∈B ∈ E .
The following lemma states that if there is a type morphism ϕ from T to T 
and at some state (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) of T player i would believe ET conditional on each
B ∈ F, then at the corresponding state (σ, ϕ1 (τ1 ), ϕ2 (τ2 )) in T  player i would
believe ET  conditional on each B ∈ F. By induction, the result also holds for
higher-order beliefs about ET  .
11 See, for example, axioms K2-K6 in Osborne and Rubinstein [21], pp 69-70. Axiom K1
obviously does not hold because βi,F is not a knowledge operator. K1 is replaced by the
weaker axiom that player i does not have contradictory conditional beliefs: βi,F (∅) = ∅.
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Lemma 4. Suppose that ϕ is a type morphism from T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 )
to T  = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) and let E ⊂ Σ × ∆B (Σ) × ∆B (Σ) be measurable.
Then
ϕ(ET ) ⊂ ET 
and for all integers n ≥ 1, for all collections {i1 , ..., in } and {F1 , ..., Fn } with
ik ∈ {1, 2} and ∅ = Fk ⊂ B for all k = 1, . . . , n,
ϕ ((βi1 ,F1 ,T ◦ ... ◦ βin ,Fn ,T )(ET )) ⊂ (βi1 ,F1 ,T  ◦ ... ◦ βin ,Fn ,T  )(ET  ).

Proof: Since ϕ is a type-morphism from T to T  , mrgΣ gi,B (τi ) = mrgΣ gi,B
(ϕi (τi ))

for all i, τi , B. This implies ϕ(ET ) ⊂ ET . Thus the ﬁrst statement is true.
Remark 3 implies that the second statement is true for n = 1. An obvious
induction argument (again using Remark 3) implies that the second statement
is true for all n.

5

Interactive Epistemology and Rationality in
Dynamic Games

We now apply the foregoing analysis to the theory of dynamic games. For the
sake of simplicity we only consider ﬁnite games with observed actions. On the
other hand, we allow for incomplete information because this does not alter the
analysis in any signiﬁcant way.

5.1

Games of Incomplete Information with Observed Actions

Consider a ﬁnite, two-person, multistage game with observed actions and incomplete information (see, e.g., [13], Chapter 8, or [21], Chapter 12) without
the probabilistic structure. Let Θi the set of payoﬀ-relevant types for player
i. A payoﬀ-relevant type θi ∈ Θi corresponds to i’s private information about
payoﬀ-relevant aspects of the game and has to be distinguished from the epistemic type which speciﬁes i’s attitudes to have certain conditional beliefs given
certain events. Players’ beliefs about the opponent’s payoﬀ-relevant type will
be speciﬁed within an epistemic model. We will omit the adjective “payoﬀrelevant” whenever no confusion can arise. H denotes the set of partial histories,
which includes the empty history φ, and Z denotes the set of terminal histories.
The set of strategies for player i (functions from H to feasible actions) is denoted
Si . Player i preferences over lotteries are represented by a VNM utility function
ui : Z×Θ1 × Θ2 → R. Static games, games of complete information and games
of perfect information are included in this class of games as special cases.12
12 A game is static if H = {φ}, has complete information if Θ × Θ is a singleton, and has
1
2
perfect information if for each h ∈ H either player 1 or player 2 has only one feasible action.
We are assuming that the set of feasible actions of each player may be history-dependent,
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The basic elements of our analysis are strategy-type pairs (si , θi ) ∈ Si × Θi ,
i = 1, 2. A generic pair for player i is denoted σi and the set of such feasible pairs
is Σi := Si × Θi . The external state space is Σ := Σ1 × Σ2 with generic element
σ = (σ1 , σ2 ) = (s1 , θ1 , s2 , θ2 ). When there is complete information each Θi is a
singleton and Σ simply represents set of strategy pairs. For each history h, Si (h)
denotes the set of player i’s strategies consistent with h, Σi (h) = Si (h) × Θi is
the set of σi consistent with h, and Σ(h) = Σ1 (h) × Σ2 (h) is the set of external
states inducing h. H(si ) is the set of partial histories consistent with si , that is,
H(si ) := {h ∈ H : si ∈ Si (h)}. For every partial history h, Σj (h) is a strategic
form representation of i’s information about j at h. We can obtain a strategic
form payoﬀ function Ui : Σ → R in the usual way: for all (z, θ1 , θ2 ) ∈ Z×Θ1 ×Θ2
and (s1 , θ1 , s2 , θ2 ) ∈ Σ(z), Ui (s1 , θ1 , s2 , θ2 ) = ui (z, θ1 , θ2 ).
To illustrate our game-theoretic notation, consider the signalling game depicted in Figure 1. We have Θ1 = {θ1 , θ1 }, Θ2 = {θ2 } is a singleton, thus the set
of pairs of types is Θ1 ×Θ2 = {θ , θ }. The set of partial histories is H = {φ, (R)}
and the set of outcomes is {(L), (R, u), (R, d)} × {θ , θ }. The set of external
states is (S1 × Θ1 ) × (S2 × Θ1 ), where S1 = {L, R} and S2 = {u, d} (a means
“choose action a if R is observed,” a ∈ {u, d}.) The “strategic representation” of
partial history (R) is Σ(R) = {(R, θ1 ), (R, θ1 )} × {(u,θ2 ), (d,θ2 )}. To draw the
picture we rely on the fact that the set of triples (h, θ1 , θ2 ) ∈ (H ∪ Z) × Θ1 × Θ2
can be regarded as an arborescence with initial nodes (φ, θ1 , θ2 ) ∈ {φ}×Θ1 ×Θ2
and terminal nodes (z, θ1 , θ2 ) ∈ Z × Θ1 × Θ2 .13 For each type θi and partial
history h, {h} × {θi } × Θi corresponds to an information set for player i in the
graphical representation. For example, {(θ1 , θ2 , (R)), (θ1 , θ2 , (R))} corresponds
to the information set for player 2 depicted in Figure 1.
We are interested in players’ (mutual) conditional beliefs at each (commonly
observable) partial history h. Thus the collection of relevant hypotheses in this
context is B = {B : ∃h ∈ H, B = Σ(h)}. Note that Σ ∈ B, because Σ = Σ(φ),
where φ is the empty history. In order to complete the model we have to
introduce a(n) (epistemic) type-space T = (Σ, B, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ). A complete type
for player i is a pair (θi , τi ) ∈ Θi × Ti corresponding to a vector (θi , gi (τi )) ∈
Θi × ∆B (Σ × Tj ).14 This description of an interactive epistemic model based on
a dynamic game is consistent with several papers about the theory of extensive
form games. In particular, it can be regarded as a generalization of the epistemic
model put forward by Ben Porath [7].
Since each element of B represents the event that some history h occurs, we
but not type-dependent. The extension to the case of type-dependent feasibility constraints
is conceptually straightforward, but requires a more complex notation.
13 The precedence relation is: (θ , θ , h) precedes (θ  , θ  , h ) if and only if (θ , θ ) = (θ  , θ  )
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
and h is a preﬁx (initial subhistory) of h . Clearly, to obtain the standard graph-theoretic representation simultaneous moves have to be ordered in some arbitrary way adding information
sets appropriately.
14 In static games Θ × T corresponds to the set of types in the sense of Harsanyi [15].
i
i
In most applications of the theory of games with incomplete information Θi is assumed to
coincide with Ti and the functions gi , i = 1, 2, are derived from a common prior on Θ1 × Θ2
and a Bayesian equilibrium proﬁle.
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Figure 1

simplify our notation for CPSs on Σ or Σ × Ti (i = 1, 2) and replace B with H.
Indeed, we shall denote strategic form events B = Σ(h) ∈ B by h ∈ H whenever
needed (and in particular, in subscripts denoting conditioning events.)
Note that B satisﬁes the product condition 3 of Section 3: since Σ(h) =
Σ1 (h) × Σ2 (h) for all h ∈ H, we have
B ⊂ {B ⊂ Σ : ∃B1 ∈ B1 , ∃B2 ∈ B2 , B = B1 × B2 },
where
Bi = {Σi (h) : h ∈ H} i = 1, 2.
For notational simplicity, we shall write ∆Bi (Σi ) and ∆Bi (Σi × Ti ) as ∆H (Σi )
and ∆H (Σi × Ti ) for i = 1, 2, and no confusion will arise.
Finally, we continue to identify singletons with their unique elements. For
example, given h ∈ H or F ⊂ H, we write (gi,h (τi ))h∈H ∈ ∆H (Σ × Tj ) and
βi,F (E) instead of (gi,Σ(h) (τi ))Σ(h)∈B ∈ ∆B (Σ × Tj ) and βi,{Σ(h):h∈F } (E).
We are formally assuming that a player has beliefs about her own strategy
and payoﬀ-relevant type. Considering a player’s beliefs about her own strategy
is germane to extensive from analysis, because the choice of player i at a given
history is motivated by her beliefs about the opponents’ and her own behavior
later on in the game. However, it is natural to focus on player i’s beliefs about
the opponent. We assume that a rational player i is certain of her strategy and
type and that she takes a best response against her beliefs about the opponent.
These beliefs are represented by a conditional probability system µij ∈ ∆H (Σj ×
Tj ) with corresponding ﬁrst order beliefs (mrgΣj µij,h )h∈H ∈ ∆H (Σj ).
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Deﬁnition 6. Let (si , θi ) ∈ Σi , µ = (µ(·|Σj (h))h∈H ∈ ∆H (Σj ). Strategy si is
a best response to µ for type θi , written (si , θi ) ∈ ri (µ), if for all h ∈ H(si ),
si ∈ Si (h)

[Ui (si , θi , σj ) − Ui (si , θi , σj )] µ(σj |Σj (h)) ≥ 0.
σj ∈Σj (h)

Note that this is a best response property for plans of actions,15 as maximization is required only at histories consistent with the given strategy (cf. Reny
[23].) A standard dynamic programming argument shows for every µ ∈ ∆H (Σj ),
ri (µ) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 7. Fix a type space T = (Σ, H, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ). Player i is rational
at state (si , θi , σj , τi , τj ) in T if
(1) epistemic type τi is always certain of θi and is certain of si whenever possible,
that is, for all h ∈ H, gi,h (τi ) (Si × {θi } × Σj × Tj ) = 1 and if si ∈ Si (h),
gi,h (τi ) ({(si , θi )} × Σj × Tj ) = 1,
5 in Section 3),
(2) gi (τi ) ∈ I∆H
 (Σi , Σj × Tj ) (see Deﬁnition

(3) (si , θi ) ∈ ri (mrgΣj gi,h (τi ))h∈H .
Condition (1) says that a rational player knows her type and chooses actions
according to a speciﬁc plan she intends to implement. In most epistemic models
for games a property like (1) is assumed to hold globally, while we only require
that it holds at states where player i is rational. Condition (2) says that the
beliefs of a rational player can be decomposed into marginal beliefs about herself
and about the opponent. In a static model (2) is implied by (1), but in a dynamic
model player i might change her beliefs about the opponents simply because she
deviated from her own plan. A condition similar to (2) is assumed explicitly
in Reny [24, 25] and implicitly in Ben Porath [7].16 Note that the natural
extension of (2) to an n-person game would not require that player i’ beliefs
be uncorrelated. In fact, the marginal µi,−i ∈ ∆H (Σ−i × T−i ) might exhibit
correlation. Independence of beliefs about the opponents should be studied as
a separate assumption (see [6].)
In the following, we shall discuss a number of (ﬁnite) epistemic models for
games. Our analysis will focus on states in which Conditions (1) and (2) above
hold and there is common certainty of this fact. This allows us to represent
a (ﬁnite) type space in a compact tabular form. Consider for example the
following table, which refers to the game in Figure 1 above; we use the notation
gij,h (τi ) = mrgΣj ×Tj gi,h (τi ).
15 Two strategies s and s are realization equivalent if H(s ) = H(s ) and s (h) = s (h) for
i
i
i
i
i
i
all h ∈ H(si ). A plan of action is a maximal set of realization equivalent strategies.
16 Condition (2) is not really essential for our analysis and in the previous version of this
paper (2) was not used. In fact, it can be shown that for every state (σ, ti , tj ) in the universal
type space where (1) and (3) are satisﬁed, there is a state (σ, ti , tj ) where (1), (2) and (3) are
satisﬁed and the beliefs of ti about j coincide with the beliefs of ti at each h consistent with
σi . However, assuming (2) facilitates the comparison with the literature.

Battigalli and Siniscalchi

Epistemology and Rationality

(σ1 , τ1 )
g12,φ (τ1 )
((L, θ ), τ11 )
1,0
0,1
((L, θ ), τ12 )
1,0
((R, θ ), τ13 )
1,0
((R, θ ), τ14 )
g21,φ (τ2 )
(σ2 , τ2 )
(u, τ21 )
p, 0, 0, 1 − p
q, 1 − q, 0, 0
(d, τ22 )
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g12,(R) (τ1 )
1,0
0,1
1,0
1,0
g21,(R) (τ2 )
0, 0, 0, 1
0, 0, 1, 0

Table 1: A type space for the game in Figure 1
Although Table 1 does not display an exhaustive list of states and shows only
the marginal beliefs about the opponent, it contains all the essential information.
A type space corresponding to a table like Table 1 can be constructed according
to the following conventions:
• (i) For each player i, Ti is the set of epistemic types τik listed in the table.
A similar convention holds for Θi (θi is omitted if Θi is a singleton.) But
not all strategies need be listed in the table (see Table 2 below.)
• (ii) For each row k of player i in the table, the pair (ski , θik , τik ) satisﬁes
Conditions (1) and (2) in Deﬁnition 7. This completely determines the
conditional beliefs gi,h (τik ) at histories h ∈ H(si ). Otherwise, the CPS
gi (τik ) is completed so as to satisfy (1) and (2).
• (iii) The set of states is completed by taking, for each i, all the combinations (si , θi , τi ) ∈ Si × Θi × Ti . (Note that, by convention (i), all the states
not listed in the table violate (1).)
• (iv) Only the probabilities of (coordinates of) states listed in the table
are shown (the kth number is the probability of opponent’s row k.) The
probabilities of other states are always zero. Thus the set of states listed
in the table is a belief-closed subset of Σ × T1 × T2 .
¿From a substantive viewpoint, the following remarks are in order:
• Player 1’s beliefs about her opponent are the same at the beginning of the
game and after the history (R). This is a consequence of the independence
assumption, together with Bayes’ rule.
• Choosing R is strictly dominated for Player 1’s payoﬀ-type θ . Hence, at
any state ((R, θ ), σ2 , τ13 , τ2 ), for any σ2 ∈ {u, d} and τ2 ∈ {τ21 , τ22 }, Player
1 is not rational.
• If x > 0, type τ21 (resp. τ22 ) of Player 2 justiﬁes choice u (resp. d.)
Therefore, in any of the explicitly described states, Player 1 is certain of
Player 2’s rationality.
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Further comments on this game will be provided below.
The set of states in T where player i is rational is denoted Ri,T . The event
that every player is rational is RT = R1,T ∩R2,T . Whenever no confusion arises,
we drop the reference to the given type space in our notation and simply write
Ri for the event “player i is rational” and βi,F (E) for the event “player i is
certain of E conditional on each h ∈ F.”

5.2

Common Certainty of the Opponent’s Rationality

We are interested in the following question (among others): “What might player
i do if (1) she is rational and (2) for all h ∈ F, she believes that her opponent
is rational, (3) for all h ∈ F, she believes that, for all h ∈ F, her opponent
believes that she is rational, (4) ...?” In other words we ask for the consequences
of rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality conditional
on a given collection of histories (cf. Reny [24].)
Formally, the statement “There is common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F from the point of view of player i” corresponds to the following
event:
CCORi,F := βi,F (Rj ) ∩ βi,F (βj,F (Ri )) ∩ βi,F (βj,F (βi,F (Rj ))) ∩ ...
(βi1 ,F ◦ ... ◦ βin ,F ) (Rin+1 ), i1 = i, ik+1 = ik .

=
n≥1

Hence, the statement “There is common certainty of the opponent’s rationality
given F” corresponds to the event
CCORF := CCOR1,F ∩ CCOR2,F
Finally, let R := R1 ∩ R2 .
Deﬁnition 8. We say that σ is consistent with rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F if there are a type space T and a
pair of types (τ1 , τ2 ) such that
(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ R ∩ CCORF
If F is a singleton (F = {h} for some h) we obtain a notion of common
certainty of the opponent’s rationality at a given history (cf. Reny [25].) In
particular, we may be interested in the consequences of common certainty of the
opponent’s rationality at the beginning of the game, that is, given the empty
history h = φ (cf. Ben Porath [7].)17
17 In games with observed actions, a relevant hypothesis B = Σ(h) represents an event
that becomes common knowledge when history h occurs. Hence, an event such as CCORh ∩
(Σ(h) × T1 × T2 ) may be interpreted as saying that history h occurs, and as soon as this
becomes common knowledge, there is common certainty of the opponent’s rationality.
Information sets in general extensive games do not correspond to common knowledge events.
This is not problematic for certain applications (see, e.g., Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5].) However, Battigalli and Bonanno [4]) show how to enrich the conventional formalization of general
extensive games to fully describe the players’ information at every node.
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There is a compact and convenient way to express event Ri ∩ CCORi,F . Let
1
:= Ri , i = 1, 2. For all n > 1, i = j, deﬁne
Ri,F
n−1
n
Ri,F
= Ri ∩ βi,F (Rj,F
).

Clearly,

2
= Ri ∩ βi,F (Rj ).
Ri,F

Since βi,F satisﬁes conjunction, an easy induction argument shows that
n
= Ri ∩ βi,F (Rj ) ∩ ... ∩ (βi,F ◦ ... ◦ βj,F )(Ri ), n > 2 odd,
Ri,F
n
= Ri ∩ βi,F (Rj ) ∩ ... ∩ (βi,F ◦ ... ◦ βj,F ◦ βi,F )(Rj ), n > 2 even.
Ri,F

Therefore
n
Ri,F
.

CCORi,F =
n≥1

5.2.1

Examples

We begin with an analysis of the game in Figure 1, along with the epistemic
model deﬁned by the tables in Subsection 5.1. Assume that x > 0.
Consider the state ((L, θ ), d, τ12 , τ22 ) corresponding to the second row in the
left-hand table and the second row in the right-hand table. Clearly, both players
choose best responses to their beliefs. In particular, Player 2 is certain at φ that
Player 1, regardless of her type, will choose L, so that the history (R) should not
occur. However, if it does, Player 2 revises his beliefs and becomes convinced
that Player 1’s payoﬀ-relevant type is θ , which justiﬁes his own choice of d.
Observe that this implies that, after history (R), type τ22 of Player 2 is no
longer certain that Player 1 is rational. However, at φ his beliefs are concentrated on states at which Player 1 chooses optimally, and this holds for the
beliefs of Player 2’s type τ21 as well. That is, in any explicitly described state,
Player 2 is certain of Player 1’s rationality at the beginning of the game.
This, in turn, implies that, in any explicitly described state, Player 1 is
certain at φ that (Player 2 is certain at φ that (Player 1 is rational).)
It is easy to see that, in fact, there is common certainty of the opponent’s
rationality at φ in state ((L, θ ), d, τ12 , τ22 ). Of course, in that state common
certainty of rationality would fail after the counterfactual history (R).
Consider now state ((R, θ ), u, τ14 , τ21 ). It is easy to see that here, too, there
is common certainty of the opponent’s rationality at φ. However, regardless of
the value of p = g21,φ (τ21 )((L, θ ), τ11 )), now Player 2 remains convinced that
Player 1 is rational even after observing R (which is an unexpected event, if
p = 0.) Thus, Player 2’s type τ21 is actually certain of Player 1’s rationality
given F = {φ, (R)}.
Indeed, since g12,φ (τ14 )((u, τ21 )) = g12,φ (τ11 )((u, τ21 )) = 1, Player 1 is certain
at φ (hence, by independence and Bayes’ rule, also after (R)) that Player 2
is certain of 1’s rationality given F. One sees easily that ((R, θ ), u, τ14 , τ21 ) ∈
R ∩ CCORF .
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Figure 2

Thus, insisting on common certainty of the opponent’s rationality at every
history reﬁnes our prediction about the behavior of Player 1’s type θ . The
underlying argument has the ﬂavor of forward induction: faced with a deviation
from his original prediction, Player 2 attempts to ﬁnd an explanation for Player
1’s choice of R which is consistent with the assumption that she is rational;
but this implies that he has to assign conditional probability one to Player 1’s
payoﬀ-relevant type θ — and consequently best-respond with u. Of course,
Player 1 anticipates this, which makes R optimal at φ.
Notice however that this kind of reasoning leads to inconsistencies if x < 0.
Intuitively, in this case if Player 1 is rational and is certain at φ that Player 2
(i) is rational and (ii) is certain at both φ and (R) that his opponent is rational,
she should expect Player 2 to choose d, and should therefore pick L herself. But
then Player 2 cannot be certain after history (R) that Player 1 is able to reason
along these lines, precisely because then she would not choose R.
This informal argument suggests that rationality and common certainty of
rationality given F are impossible in this game. In the next subsection we will
show that rationality and common certainty of rationality given a family of
histories F identify a simple iterative deletion procedure. We shall then be able
to show that the above intuition is correct by noting that no strategy proﬁle
survives the relevant procedure in the game of Figure 1.
The game of complete and perfect information depicted in Figure 2 (cf. Figure 5 in Reny [24]) further illustrates the diﬀerences between common certainty
of the opponent’s rationality for a given history and for a collection of histories.
Table 2 shows all the essential elements of a type space for this game with four
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epistemic types for each player. (Recall that we show only the states satisfying
conditions (1) and (2) of Deﬁnition 7. We do not list all the eight strategies of
Player 1 and we do not specify the beliefs of Player 1 when she is irrational.)
(σ1 , τ1 )
Lab , τ11
Lbb , τ12
Raa , τ13
Rab , τ14

φ, (R), (L)
0,1,0,0
...
...
0,0,0,1

(L, l)
0,1,0,0
...
...
0,1,0,0

(R, r )
0,1,0,0
...
...
0,0,0,1

(σ2 , τ2 )
ll , τ21
lr , τ22
rl , τ23
rr , τ24

φ
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
0,0,0,1

(L), (L, l)
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
1,0,0,0
0,1,0,0

(R), (R, r )
0,0, 34 , 14
0,0,0,1
0,0, 34 , 14
0,0,0,1

Table 2: A type space for the game in Figure 2
It can be veriﬁed that common certainty of the opponent’s rationality at
histories/nodes (L) and (R) is possible. For example,
(Lab , lr , τ11 , τ22 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR{φ,(L)} , (Rab , lr , τ14 , τ22 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR{φ,(R)} .
Note also that state (Lab , lr , τ11 , τ22 ) satisﬁes the property the there would be
common certainty of the opponent’s rationality if (R) occurred, even though
state (Lab , lr , τ11 , τ22 ) precludes history (R). Therefore,
(Lab , lr , τ11 , τ22 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR{φ,(L)} ∩ CCOR{φ,(R)} .
However, we argue that common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given
{φ, (L), (R)} is impossible: if player 2 is rational and believes after (L) that
player 1 is rational, player 2 chooses l after (L). Anticipating this and being
3
⊃ CCOR{φ,(L),(R)} , player 1 chooses L.
rational, as implied by R1,{φ,(L),(R)}
But then the occurrence of history (R) would imply that either player 1 is
irrational or she does not believe that player 2 would believe at (L) that player
3
1 is rational. Therefore player 2 could not believe event R1,{φ,(L),(R)}
after
history (R) and this implies CCOR{φ,(L),(R)} = ∅. The characterization result
provided below can be used to verify our claim with a simple iterative deletion
procedure.
5.2.2

Characterization

We can ask the following questions about common certainty of the opponent’s
rationality:
(i) How can we characterize the set of σ consistent with rationality and
common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F without any reference
to epistemic types?
(ii) When we consider the set of σ consistent with rationality and common
certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F, can we restrict our attention to
ﬁnite type spaces (more generally, type spaces with the same cardinality of Σ)?
(iii) Can we restrict our attention to the universal type space T u containing all the hierarchies of conditional systems satisfying common certainty of
coherency?
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It is known that, for static games, the answers to (ii) and (iii) are aﬃrmative
and that the answer to the characterization problem (i) is given by an inductive
procedure equivalent to the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.18
These results can now be extended to dynamic games. Let us start from (i). By
analogy with the analysis of static games the answer should rely on an inductive
procedure. For any Kj ⊂ Σj , F ⊂ H, let


Λi,F (Kj ) := µij ∈ ∆H (Σj ) : ∀h ∈ F, µij (Kj |Σj (h)) = 1 .
(Note that, if F is “large” and Kj is “small,” Λi,F (Kj ) may well be empty.)
The inductive procedure is deﬁned as follows:
• Σ0i,F = Σi , i ∈ {1, 2},



n
• for n ≥ 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, Σn+1
i,F = ri Λi,F (Σj,F ) .

That is, Σn+1
i,F is the set of (si , θi ) such that si is a best response for θi to some
CPS µij satisfying µij (Σnj,F |Σj (h)) = 1 for all h ∈ F. Note that Σ1i,F is the set of
σi consistent with player i being rational and does not depend on F. The natural
conjecture is that the set of σ consistent with rationality and common certainty
∞
n
n
of the opponent’s rationality given F is Σ∞
1,F × Σ2,F :=
n≥1 Σ1,F × Σ2,F .
n
n
n
Deﬁne ΣF := Σ1,F × Σ2,F , n = 1, 2, ..., ∞, and
ρF (K1 × K2 ) := r1 [Λ1,F (K2 )] × r2 [Λ2,F (K1 )] .
Clearly ρF is a monotone set to set operator,19 Σn+1
= ρF (ΣnF ) and the sequence
F
n ∞
{ΣF }n=0 is (weakly) decreasing. Since Σ is ﬁnite there is some N such that, for
n
∞
all n ≥ N , Σ∞
F = ΣF . This implies that the product set ΣF has the familiar
∞
∞
ﬁxed point property: ΣF = ρF (ΣF ). It is easy to prove (using monotonicity of
ρF ) that every rectangular subset Σ∗ such that Σ∗ ⊂ ρF (Σ∗ ) is a subset of Σ∞
F.
may
well
be
empty
(cf.
Reny
[24]
and
the
related
comments
in
In general, Σ∞
F
20
is
nonempty.
Given
the
ﬁxed
the next section.) But it can be shown that Σ∞
φ
∞
point property of Σ∞
F it is easy to verify that ΣF = ∅ if and only if, for all
∞
h ∈ F, ΣF ∩ Σ(h) = ∅.
The following results relate operator ρF and procedure {ΣnF } to (rationality
and) common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F.
18 These results have been explicitly proved for normal-form games of complete information,
but they can be extended to games of incomplete information.
19 A set to set operator ρ is monotone if A ⊂ B implies ρ(A) ⊂ ρ(B) (⊂ denotes weak
inclusion.)
20 The

proof goes as follows: Take any non-empty rectangular subset Σ∗ ⊂ Σ. Then, for
each player i and opponent j, there is a CPS µij ∈ ∆H (Σj ) such that µij (Σ∗j |Σj ) = 1, and
for each θi we can ﬁnd a strategy si ∈ Si such that (si , θi ) ∈ ri (µij ). When we apply this
construction to Σ∗ = Σ, we obtain Σ1φ = ∅. The construction can be applied inductively to
n+1
Σ∗ = Σ n
= ∅.
φ = ∅, thus obtaining Σφ
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Lemma 5. Let Σ∗ = Σ∗1 × Σ∗2 ⊂ Σ, ∅ = F ⊂ H. If Σ∗ ⊂ ρF (Σ∗ ), then there is
a type space T = (Σ, H, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) such that
(a) T1 × T2 has the same cardinality as Σ,
(b) for all σ ∈ Σ∗ , there is a pair of epistemic types (τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ T1 × T2 such that
(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR F .
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Fix a non empty collection F of partial histories.
(i) The set of σ consistent with rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given F (cf. Deﬁnition 8) is precisely Σ∞
F.
(ii) There is a ﬁnite type space T such that, for all σ ∈ Σ, σ is consistent with
rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality if and only if
(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR F
for some (τ1 , τ2 ) in T (events are deﬁned in the ﬁnite type space T .)
(iii) For all σ ∈ Σ, σ is consistent with rationality and common certainty of the
opponent’s rationality given F if and only if there is some pair of hierarchies of
CPSs (t1 , t2 ) ∈ T × T such that
(σ, t1 , t2 ) ∈ R ∩ CCOR F
(events are deﬁned in the universal type space T u .)
∞
∞
Proof: (i) Since Σ∞
F = ρF (ΣF ), Lemma 5 implies that every σ in ΣF is
consistent with rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality. To prove the converse, ﬁx a type space T = (Σ, H, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ) and, for
n
}n≥1 deﬁned in T as indicated
i = 1, 2, consider the sequence of events {Ri,F
in the preceding subsection. We show by induction that for each i and n the
n
on Σi is (weakly) contained in Σni,F . This implies the asprojection of Ri,F
n
. To simplify the notation, let
sertion, because Ri ∩ CCOR i,F = n≥1 Ri,F
λij (τi ) = (λij,h (τi ))h∈H denote the system of ﬁrst order beliefs for type τi concerning her opponent: that is, for all h ∈ H,

λij,h (τi ) = mrgΣj gi,h (τi ).
1
. Then σi ∈ ri (λij (τi )), which implies
Base Step. Let (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ Ri = Ri,F
1
σi ∈ Σi,F .
Induction Step. Suppose that for each player i and state (σ  , τ1 , τ2 ), (σ  , τ1 , τ2 ) ∈
n+1
n
n
= Ri ∩ βi,F (Rj,F
). Since i is ratioRi implies σi ∈ Σni,F . Let (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ Ri,F
n
nal at (σ, τ1 , τ2 ), σi ∈ ri (λij (τi )). Furthermore, since type τi is certain of Rj,F
n
at each h ∈ F, the induction hypothesis (projection of Rj,F on Σj contained in
Σnj,F ) implies that for all h ∈ F, λij,h (τi )(Σnj,F ) = 1. Therefore σi ∈ Σn+1
i,F .
∞
(ii) Since Σ∞
F = ρF (ΣF ), Lemma 5 and (i) imply that there is a type space
T with the stated property and the same cardinality as the ﬁnite set Σ.
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(iii) The “if” part is true by deﬁnition. To prove the “only if” part, ﬁx σ
and suppose that for some type space T and some pair of types (τ1 , τ2 ),
(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ RT ∩ CCOR F ,T ,
where we use subscript T to denote that events and belief operators appearing in
the construction of (R and) CCOR F are deﬁned in the space T . By Proposition
3 there is a type morphism ϕ = (IdΣ , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) from T to the universal space T u .
We prove that
(σ, ϕ1 (τ1 ), ϕ2 (τ2 )) ∈ R ∩ CCOR F .
where the absence of the subscript T indicates that events and belief operators
are deﬁned in T u . We will adhere to this convention throughout the proof.
The claim follows from Lemma 4. To see this, for each i = 1, 2, let Ei ⊂
Σ × I∆H (Σi , Σj )) × I∆H (Σi , Σj ) be set of (σ, µ1 , µ2 ) such that
• µ1 and µ2 are independent CPSs; denote by µii and µij the marginal CPS
such that µi (.|Σ(h)) = µii (.|Σi (h)) ⊗ µij (.|Σj (h)) for all h ∈ H;
• for σi = (si , θi ), µii (σi |Σi (h)) = 1 for all h ∈ H(si ), and µii (Si ×
{θi }|Σi (h)) = 1 for all h ∈ H;
• σi ∈ ri (µij ).
(compare this with Deﬁnition 5.3.) Also deﬁne
Ii,T  = {(σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ Σ × T1 × T2 : gi (τi ) ∈ I∆H (Σi , Σj × Tj )}
for any type space T  = (Σ, H, T1 , T2 , g1 , g2 ). Lemma 3 in the Appendix immediately implies that
ϕ(Ii,T ) ⊂ Ii,T u
Also observe that Ri,T = Ei,T ∩ Ii,T and Ri = Ei,T u ∩ Ii,T u . Then Lemma 4
implies that for all i = 1, 2, n ≥ 1,
ϕ(Ri,T ) ⊂ ϕ(Ei,T ) ∩ ϕ(Ii,T ) ⊂ Ei,T u ∩ Ii,T u = Ri
and similarly


ϕ (βi1 ,F ,T ◦ ... ◦ βin ,F ,T )(Rin+1 ,T ) ⊂ (βi1 ,F ◦...◦βin ,F )(Rin+1 ), i1 = i, ik+1 = ik .

5.2.3

Examples (Reprise)

We can ﬁnally go back to the examples in Figures 1 and 2 and provide the
details of the arguments sketched in Subsection 5.2.1.
Consider ﬁrst the signalling game of Figure 1. We claimed above that, if
x < 0, then common certainty of rationality given F = {φ, (R)} is impossible.
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To see this, note that Σ11,F = {(L, θ ), (L, θ ), (R, θ )} and Σ22,F = {u, d}; then
Σ21,F = Σ11,F , while Σ22,F = {d}, because now Player 2 must assign probability
1 to Σ1 ((R)) ∩ Σ11,F = (R, θ ) after observing R, and we are assuming that
x < 0. But then Σ31,F = {(L, θ ), (L, θ )}, Σ32,F is unchanged, and ﬁnally
Σ42,F = ∅, because Σ1 ((R)) ∩ Σ31,F = ∅ (which implies Λ2,F (Σ31,F ) = ∅.) The
characterization result (Proposition 4) now implies that R ∩ CCOR F = ∅ in any
type space.21
Similarly, for the game in Figure 2 we obtain Σ4{φ,(L),(R)} = ∅ and this
implies that common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given the collection
of histories F = {φ, (L), (R)} is impossible.
5.2.4

CCOR in games with perfect information

In light of this conclusion, it is natural to ask whether one can ﬁnd conditions
which ensure the possibility of rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given a collection of “interesting” histories.
Using results from Reny [24], we are able to provide an answer to this question for generic games with complete and perfect information.22
First, following Reny, we deem a history h ∈ H relevant (i.e., “interesting”)
if (i) h is consistent with rationality: Σ(h) ∩ Σ1φ = ∅23 ; and (ii) at least one
player i has a payoﬀ-type θi which does not have a dominant choice 24 .
In the game of Figure 2, both (L) and (R) are relevant (as is φ.) Thus,
in that game, rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality
given all relevant nodes is not possible. Indeed, the class of games for which
rationality and common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given all relevant
nodes are possible is very small. On the other hand, when these conditions hold,
the backward induction outcome obtains:
Proposition 5. (cf. Reny [24]) Consider a game with perfect and complete
information and no ties between payoﬀs at terminal histories. Let R be the set
of its relevant histories. Then
21 On the other hand, Player 2, upon observing R, may conclude that Player 1 is rational,
but not not very sophisticated (i.e., she does not realize that Player 2 will interpret her choice
of R as a signal that her type is θ .) This reinforces his inducement to play d, which again
leads Player 1 to choose L. Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5] develop these ideas and show that
they lead to an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce [22].) A
similar set of assumptions yields the backward induction solution in the game of Figure 2.
22 Reny attempts to capture the intuitive notion of rationality and common certainty of rationality by deﬁning particular subsets of (Bayesian rational) strategy proﬁles satisfying a belief
closure condition with respect to a collection of nodes. His results concern the (non)emptiness
of such sets of strategy proﬁles.
23 The formal deﬁnition is motivated by the observation that, for any collection of histories
F ⊂ H, Σ1F = Σ1φ .
24 Type θ of Player i has a dominant choice at h ∈ H if and only if there exists a strategy s ∈
i
i
Si (h) such that, for all si ∈ Si (h) such that si (h) = si (h), Ui (si , θi , sj , θj ) > Ui (si , θi , sj , θj )
for all (sj , θj ) ∈ Σj .

Battigalli and Siniscalchi

29

Epistemology and Rationality

(a) there is a type space T for the game such that RT ∩ CCOR R,T = ∅ if and
only if every history h ∈ R is on the backward induction path;
(b) for all states (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ RT ∩ CCOR R,T , σ induces the backward induction
path.
Proof: (a) (⇒) Suppose RT ∩CCOR R,T = ∅. Then, by Proposition 4, Σ∞
R = ∅.
Observe that, for i = 1, 2 and j = i, for any collection F ⊂ H and for any
Kj ⊂ Σj ,

Σj (h)).
Λi,F (Kj ) = Λi,F (Kj ∩
h∈F

This follows directly
from the

 deﬁnition of Λi,F . Since for each i = 1, 2 and
∞
j = i, Σ∞
i,R = ri Λi,R (Σj,R ) , we conclude that

∞
Σ∞
i,R = ri Λi,R (Σj,R ∩





Σj (h))

h∈R


∞
But then Σ∞
R = ∅ implies that Σj,R ∩
h∈R Σj (h) = ∅, for i = 1, 2 and j = i.
Therefore we conclude that





∅ = Σ∞
Σi (h) = ri Λi,R (Σ∞
Σj (h)) ∩
Σi (h)
i,R ∩
j,R ∩
h∈R

h∈R

h∈R



∗
That is, letting Σ∗i,R ≡ Σ∞
i,R ∩
h∈R Σi (h) for i = 1, 2 and j = i, each set Σi,R
satisﬁes

 
Σi (h)
∅ = Σ∗i,R = ri Λi,R (Σ∗j,R ∩
h∈R

(Σ∗1,R , Σ∗2,R )

so that the pair
constitutes a nonempty jointly rational beliefs
system for R as deﬁned in Reny [24], p. 269. Hence, by the main Theorem in
that paper, all relevant histories are on the backward induction path.
(⇐) Let sB ∈ S be the backward induction strategy proﬁle. Suppose that
relevant histories are all on the backward induction path: h ∈ R ⇒ sB ∈ S(h).
B
H
For i = 1, 2, let Σ∗i = {sB
i } and consider the CPS µi ∈ ∆ (Si ) deﬁned
B
B
B
as follows: (i) if si ∈ Si (h), then µi ({si }|Si (h)) = 1; (ii) otherwise, let

B 

[sB
i ]h = {si ∈ Si (h) : si (h ) = si (h ) for all h weakly following h}, and
B
B
B
for i = 1, 2 and j = i,
let µi ({si }|Si (h)) = 1/#[si ]h for all si ∈ [si ]h . Then,

∗
B
B
∗
∗
µB
j ∈ Λi,R (Σj ), and si ∈ ri (µj ). That is, Σi ⊂ ri Λi,R (Σj ) for i = 1, 2. Now
Lemma 5 implies that RT ∩ CCOR R,T = ∅ for some (ﬁnite) type space T .
We omit the proof of part (b).

5.2.5

Common Certainty of Both Players’ Rationality

Several papers on the epistemic analysis of games focus on common certainty of
both players’ rationality at a given history, rather than common certainty of the
opponent’s rationality conditional on a collection of histories (see in particular
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Stalnaker [28] and Ben Porath [7].) In static games, there is no relevant diﬀerence between these two sets of assumptions. Since a rational player knows her
strategy and beliefs, she is certain of her own rationality. Therefore, rationality
and mutual certainty of the opponent’s rationality is equivalent to rationality
and mutual certainty of both players’ rationality. But since players’ beliefs
satisfy positive introspections, this also implies that rationality and common
certainty of the opponent’s rationality is indeed equivalent to rationality and
common certainty of both players’ rationality.
In dynamic games the result can be extended as follows.
Fix a type space T and a history h. The event that there is (would be)
common certainty of rationality at h is
CCRh = βh (R) ∩ βh (βh (R)) ∩ ... =

βhn (R),
n≥1

where βh (E) = β1,h (E) ∩ β2,h (E) and βhn+1 (E) = βh (βhn (E)). Let [h] := Σ(h) ∩
T1 ∩ T2 denote the event that history h occurs.
Proposition 6. For every type space T and history h ∈ H,
[h] ∩ R ∩ CCORh = [h] ∩ R ∩ CCRh .
Proof: Omitted.
However, we may have
(i) R ∩ β1,h (R2 ) ∩ β2,h (R1 ) = R ∩ βh (R)
and
(ii) R ∩ βF (R) = ∅ = R ∩ β1,F (R2 ) ∩ β2,F (R1 ).
To see (i) consider a state (σ, τ1 , τ2 ) ∈ R ∩ β1,h (R2 ) ∩ β2,h (R1 ) where history
/ Σ1 (h). Suppose that all best
h is counterfactual, for example, because σ1 ∈
responses to type τ1 ’s (ﬁrst-order) beliefs prevent h from being reached. If h
were reached, player 1 could not believe that she is rational, because she would
know that she has deviated from her best response. To see (ii) suppose that F
contains two mutually exclusive histories h and h encoding diﬀerent actions
for player 1 at a common predecessor h. Then it may be impossible to ﬁnd a
single (ﬁrst-order) belief for player 1 justifying both actions even if both h and
h are consistent with player 1’s rationality.

6

Concluding Remarks

In this paper we provide the main tools for the epistemic analysis of multiagent dynamic models and we consider some applications to multistage games
with observed actions. Taking as given a collection of conditioning events —
or “relevant hypotheses” — concerning external (i.e., non-epistemic) states, we
construct a belief-closed space T of (coherent) inﬁnite hierarchies of conditional
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probability systems (CPSs.) An inﬁnite hierarchy of CPSs encodes an individual’s dispositions to believe conditional on every relevant hypothesis — that is,
an individual’s epistemic type.
The set Ω = Σ × T × T of proﬁles of external states and inﬁnite hierarchies
of CPSs can be interpreted as a universal (semantic) model providing truth
conditions, at every state ω ∈ Ω, for subjunctive conditionals of the form “if B
occurred, player i would believe E,” where B is a relevant hypothesis, E is an
event concerning the external state and/or the agents’ interactive conditional
beliefs, and the truth value is assigned even if B is counterfactual at ω (ω ∈
/ B.)
Of course, subjunctive conditionals are crucial for the analysis of counterfactual
reasoning in extensive form (dynamic) games.
Other authors, including Ben Porath [7] and Stalnaker [28], put forward
“extensive form” epistemic models, but — to the best of our knowledge — we
are the ﬁrst to provide the explicit construction of a universal type space of this
sort, thus extending classical results of Mertens and Zamir [19] and Brandenburger and Dekel [10] to a dynamic framework. In particular, to facilitate the
comparison with this literature, we mimic as closely as possible the elegant and
relatively simple construction of [10].
The space of inﬁnite hierarchies of CPSs is an important analytical tool
because it does not exclude any “conceivable” epistemic type; thus, it provides
an “epistemically neutral” representation of interactive conditional beliefs. This
allows us to state characterization results in a clean “if-and-only-if” form (i.e.,
“for all σ ∈ Σ, σ belongs to the solution set Σ∗ if and only if there is a proﬁle
of epistemic types such that . . . ”)
Universal type spaces are particularly important for the epistemic analysis of
solution concepts featuring forward induction. According to forward induction
reasoning, a player always seeks a “rational” explanation of her opponent’s observed behavior. When the extensive form game is embellished with an epistemic
model, this amounts to looking for an opponent’s epistemic type (equivalently,
a hierarchy of conditional beliefs) that “rationalizes” the opponents’ actions.
Thus, adopting a non-universal model eﬀectively restricts the alternative explanations available to a player. While constraining players’ inferences may
be desirable in certain applications, the restrictions implicit in a non-universal
model prevent a neutral analysis of forward induction reasoning. We pursue
this topic in Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5, 6] (see also Stalnaker [29].)
On the other hand, for many purposes — in particular, for the analysis of
speciﬁc examples and in the proofs of some results — it is more convenient
to work with “small” (e.g., ﬁnite) non-universal type spaces. Therefore it is
important to be able to relate extensive form type spaces to each other and to
the space of inﬁnite hierarchies of CPSs. We extend Mertens and Zamir’s (1985)
notion of “belief-preserving” mappings between type spaces (type-morphisms)
and their fundamental result showing that every type space is equivalent to a
belief-closed subset of the space of inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs.
The main result of our game theoretic analysis is the characterization of (rationality and) common certainty of the opponent’s rationality given an arbitrary
collection F of histories (i.e., R ∩ CCORF , in the notation of Section 5.)
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We build on and extend previous work by Ben Porath [7] and Reny [24].
Ben Porath restricts his analysis to ﬁnite type spaces for perfect information
games and characterizes the strategies consistent with initial common certainty
of rationality.25 He conjectures that his characterization is also valid for inﬁnite
type spaces. Our results conﬁrm his conjecture, show that his type spaces can
be embedded into an explicitly constructed universal type space, and generalize
his characterization.
Reny [24] studies the possibility of common certainty of the opponent’s rationality conditional on certain collections of nodes in a perfect information
game. His analysis does not employ a formal extensive-form epistemic model,
but rather veriﬁes whether one can ﬁnd non-empty subsets of strategy proﬁles
satisfying an intuitive ﬁxed point property. Our results provide an “epistemic
validation” of Reny’s analysis.
Our work is also related to Stalnaker’s [28, 29] analysis of counterfactual
reasoning in games. Stalnaker’s approach draws on the philosophical work discussing the axioms that belief revision should satisfy independently of any particular information structure (see, e.g., Gärdenfors [14] and references therein.)
A belief revision function speciﬁes which events an individual would believe if
she came to be certain of any particular — epistemic and/or external — event B.
The probabilistic version of a belief revision function is a complete conditional
probability system, specifying conditional beliefs for every nonempty subset of
the relevant set of states (Myerson [20].) To use our terminology and notation,
let gi (τi ) ∈ ∆B (Σ × Tj ) be the CPS corresponding to type τi . While in our
notion of type space B is a collection of non empty subsets of Σ typically given
by some kind of information structure, in Stalnaker [28, 29] B is the collection
of all nonempty subsets of Σ × Tj . Clearly, this is not a trivial diﬀerence. Since
we are given an information structure, we are only interested in the beliefs an
individual would have conditional on observable events. Hence we can aﬀord
to be more parsimonious in representing epistemic types and we are able to
construct a universal type space. While Lemma 4 “justiﬁes” using type spaces
in our sense, we doubt that an analogous result holds for Stalnaker’s epistemic
spaces. However, it is easily shown that every epistemic model à la Stalnaker
generates a type space in our sense (i.e., a type space à la Ben Porath) and —
more interestingly — every ﬁnite type space in our sense can be “enriched” so
as to become a type space à la Stalnaker.
Finally, we ﬁnd it useful to compare our epistemic analysis with Aumann [1]
and related papers, such as Aumann [2], Samet [27] and Balkenborg and Winter
[3]. There are two main diﬀerences between Aumann’s approach and ours. First,
Aumann and the other authors just mentioned assume that the players’ initial
epistemic state can be described by means of knowledge partitions on the set of
states of the world. This can be expressed within our framework as a property
which holds “locally” (i.e., an event): players’ initial beliefs (in a ﬁnite type
space) assign positive probability to the true state and this is (initially) common
certainty.
25 He

also provides suﬃcient epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium outcomes.

Battigalli and Siniscalchi

Appendix

33

The second diﬀerence is more radical and makes it diﬃcult to compare this
set of papers with those discussed above:26 in Aumann’s epistemic model, a
state of the world describes the players’ strategies (dispositions to act) and
their initial epistemic state, but it does not describe how a player would revise
her beliefs, should she learn that a particular history h has occurred. However,
a belief revision theory of a sort is implicit in his deﬁnition of “rationality”
(and made explicit in Aumann [2]): Suppose that player i is initially certain
that his opponent’s strategy prescribes action a at history h , which (weakly)
follows history h, then she is certain of this also at h, whatever “at h” means.
Note that this is completely unrelated to Bayesian updating. There is no notion
that, upon learning that h has occurred, player i discards all the states of the
world inconsistent with h. Indeed, it may well be the case that, in a model à
la Aumann, no state of the world is consistent with h and yet each player has
well-deﬁned beliefs at h.27
Also, Samet’s [27] theory of “hypothetical knowledge,” — although interesting in its own right — is unrelated to Bayesian updating. In that paper, a
state of the world does not only describe players’ strategies and initial epistemic
state (knowledge), but also what each player imagines she would know if any
hypothetical event H (possibly inconsistent with her initial knowledge) were
the case. This is diﬀerent from this player imagining what she would know (or
believe) if she learned that H has occurred. In fact, Samet does not assume
that player i imagines that if H were the case she would know it. (For example,
we know that the Earth is not ﬂat, but we can imagine worlds were the Earth is
ﬂat and we hotly debate the competing theories about its shape without really
knowing which is true.)

7

Appendix

7.1

Proof of Lemma 1

Remark 5. Given Axioms 1 and 2, Axiom 3 is equivalent to the following:
Axiom 3’. For all B, C ∈ B such that B ⊂ C and all measurable functions
f : X → [0, 1] such that f (X\B) = {0}


f dµ(·|C) = µ(B|C) f dµ(·|B).
B
Let {µn }∞
n=1 be a sequence of CPSs weakly converging to µ ∈ [∆(X)] . We
must show that µ satisﬁes Axioms 1 and 3.
26 For
27 On

more on this comparison see also Stalnaker [29].

the other hand, suppose that player i is initially certain that her opponent’s strategy
prescribes either action a or action b at history h which weakly follows h, but she is also
initially certain that the only opponent’s strategy consistent with h being reached prescribes
a at h . According to Bayesian updating, player i should be certain at h that the opponent
would choose a at h . But in Aumann’s model this inference is incorrect.
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(Axiom 1 holds) For all B, C ∈ B, since B is clopen (cl osed and open), its
boundary is empty. Therefore B must be a µ(·|C)-continuity set and limn→∞ µn (B|C)
= µ(B|C) (see, e.g., Dudley [12], Theorem 11.1.1.) In particular,
µ(B|B) = lim µn (B|C) = 1.
n→∞

(Axiom 3 holds) Fix A ∈ A, B, C ∈ B such that A ⊂ B ⊂ C. Since any
ﬁnite Borel measure on X is (closed) regular (Dudley [12], Theorem 7.1.3), for
all ε > 0, we can ﬁnd a closed set A and an open set A∗ such that A ⊂ A ⊂ A∗
and
max {(µ(A∗ |C) − µ(A |C)) , (µ(A∗ |B) − µ(A |B))} ≤ ε,
Recall that B is (closed and) open. Therefore, the set A := B ∩ A∗ is open.
Furthermore, A ⊂ A ⊂ A ⊂ B and
max {(µ(A |C) − µ(A |C)) , (µ(A |B) − µ(A |B))} ≤ ε.
Since A and X\A are disjoint closed subsets of the normal topological space
X, by Urysohn’s lemma we can ﬁnd a continuous function f : X → [0, 1] such
that f (A ) = {1} and f (X\A ) = {0}. In particular, f (X\B) = {0}. Thus, by
Remark 5, for all n


f dµn (·|C) = µn (B|C) f dµn (·|B).
Since µn (·|C) and µn (·|B) weakly converge to µ(·|C) and µ(·|B), B is clopen,
and f is bounded and continuous, by taking limits we obtain


f dµ(·|C) = µ(B|C) f dµ(·|B).
Collecting all these equalities and inequalities and taking into account the properties of f we obtain

µ(A|C) ≤ µ(A |C) + ε ≤ µ(B|C) f dµ(·|B) + ε ≤ µ(B|C)(µ(A|B) + ε) + ε
and


µ(A|C) ≥ µ(A |C) − ε ≥ µ(B|C)


f dµ(·|B) − ε ≥ µ(B|C) (µ(A|B) − ε) − ε.

Since ε is arbitrary, µ(A|C) = µ(B|C)µ(A|B).

7.2

Proof of Proposition 3

(ϕi (Ti ) ⊂ T ) We ﬁrst verify that ϕi (Ti ) ⊂ Hc , that is, for all τi ∈ Ti , n ≥ 1,
n
n−1
⊂ X n−1 (measurable.) Then
B ∈ B, mrgX n−1 ϕn+1
i,B (τi ) = ϕi,B (τi ). Take A
 n −1 n−1

n−1
ϕn+1
× ∆B (X n−1 )) = gi,B (τi ) (ψ−i
) (A
× ∆B (X n−1 ) =
i,B (τi )(A

Battigalli and Siniscalchi

gi,B (τi )

35

Appendix



n−1
(σ, τj ) : ψ−i
(σ, τj ) ∈ An−1 = ϕni,B (τi )(An−1 ).

Claim. f ◦ ϕi = ϕ

−i ◦ gi , where ϕ−i = (IdΣ , ϕj ).
Proof of the claim. Take An ⊂ X n (measurable), B ∈ B, and let A =
C ∞ (An ). Then
n
fB (ϕi (τi ))(A) = ϕn+1
i,B (τi )(A ) =

 n −1


gi,B (τi ) (ψ−i
) ((An )) = gi,B (τi ) (σ, τj ) : (σ, ϕ1j (τj ), ..., ϕnj (τj )) ∈ An =


gi,B (τi ) ({(σ, τj ) : (σ, ϕj (τj )) ∈ A}) = gi,B (τi ) (ϕ−i )−1 (A) .
We now invoke the extension argument used
of Proposition 1.
 in the proof

Since the equality fB (ϕi (τi ))(A) = gi,B (τi ) (ϕ−i )−1 (A) holds on the algebra
of cylinders, it extends to the sigma-algebra generated by the latter, which
coincides with the Borel sigma-algebra generated by the product topology by
second-countability. Thus, the claim is proved.
Next we show by induction that for each i, ϕi (Ti ) ⊂ T := n≥1 Hcn . Recall
that ϕi (τi ) ∈ Hcn , n ≥ 2, if for all B ∈ B, fB (ϕi (τi ))(Σ × Hcn−1 ) = 1. We have
just shown that ϕi (Ti ) ⊂ Hc1 for each i (by deﬁnition, Hc1 = Hc .) Now suppose
that ϕj (Tj ) ⊂ Hcn−1 . Then for all τi ∈ Ti , B ∈ B,


fB (ϕi (τi ))(Σ × Hcn−1 ) = gi,B (τi ) (σ, τj ) : ϕj (τj ) ∈ Hcn−1 =
gi,B (τi )(Σ × Tj ) = 1,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the claim above and the second from the
induction hypothesis.
(Continuity) Continuity of ϕi is also proved by induction. Since gi is continuous and ϕ1i,B (τi ) = mrgΣ gi,B (τi ), ϕ1i is also continuous. Suppose that for
n
(σ, τj ) = (σ, ϕ1j (τj ), ..., ϕnj (τj ))
i = 1, 2, k = 1, ..., n, ϕki is continuous. Then ψ−i
n
n

is continuous in (σ, τj ). Thus, also ψ
−i is continuous. Continuity of ψ−i and gi
n+1
n
implies that ϕi
= ψ
−i ◦ gi is continuous. Thus far we have proved that each

ϕi is a continuous mapping from Ti to T and that g ◦ ϕi = ϕ
−i ◦ gi . Therefore
(IdΣ , ϕ1 , ϕ2 ) is a type-morphism from T to T u .
(Uniqueness) Suppose that φ = (IdΣ , φ1 , φ2 ) is a type-morphism from T to
u

T . We must prove that φ = ϕ. Since g ◦ φi = φ
−i ◦ gi and g is invertible,
−1 
th
φi = g ◦ φ−i ◦ gi . Thus we can write the (n + 1) element of φi (τi ) as



φn+1
(τi ) = mrgX n φ
,
−i,B (gi (τi ))
i
B∈B


where φ
−i,B (gi (τi )) is the probability measure conditional on B × T of the CPS

φ−i (gi (τi )) ∈ ∆B (Σ × T ). Thus it is suﬃcient to show that for all n ≥ 0,
n+1

i = 1, 2, B ∈ B, τi ∈ Ti , mrgX n φ
−i,B (gi (τi )) = ϕi,B (τi ). The statement is true
0
for n = 0: take a measurable subset A ⊂ Σ := X 0 , then
0
0


mrgX 0 φ
−i,B (gi (τi ))(A ) = φ−i,B (gi (τi ))(A × T ) =
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(σ, τj ) : (σ, φj (τj )) ∈ A0 × T



= gi,B (τi )(A0 × Tj ) =

mrgΣ gi,B (τi )(A0 ) = ϕ1i,B (τi ).
Suppose that the statement is true for n = 0, ..., k − 1. Then
 





, ..., mrgX k−1 φ
σ, mrgX 0 φ
−i,B (gi (τi ))
−i,B (gi (τi ))
B∈B



B∈B

k
(σ, τj ).
= ψ−i

Take Ak ⊂ X k (measurable) and let A = C ∞ (Ak ), then
k


mrgX k φ
−i,B (gi (τi ))(A ) = φ−i,B (gi (τi ))(A) =


gi,B (τi )

gi,B (τi ) ({(σ, τj ) : (σ, φj (τj )) ∈ A}) =
 





(σ, τj ) : σ, mrgX 0 φ
(g
(τ
))
,
...,
mrg
(g
(τ
))
φ
k−1
−i,B i i
−i,B i i
X
gi,B (τi )



B∈B

k
(σ, τj ) : ψ−i
(σ, τj ) ∈ Ak




B∈B

k
= ϕk+1
i,B (τi )(A ).

This concludes the proof.

7.3

Proof of Lemma 5

Proof. The statement is trivially true if Σ∗ = ∅. Suppose ∅ = Σ∗ ⊂ ρF (Σ∗ ).
Construct T as follows. Let T1 × T2 = Σ. Then, for each i we can construct a
function λij : Ti → ∆H (Σj × Tj ) such that for all τi ∈ Σ∗i ,
τi ∈ ri (λij (τi ))

and λij,h (τi )(Σ∗j ) = 1, ∀h ∈ F.

/ Σ∗i , let λij (τi ) = µj .
To complete the deﬁnition, ﬁx µj ∈ ∆H (Σj ) and, for τi ∈
Also, for any τi = (si , θi ) ∈ Ti = Σi , it is always possible to construct a CPS
λii (τi ) such that λii,h (τi )(Si × {θi }) = 1 for all h ∈ H, and λii,h (τi )({τi }) = 1
for all h ∈ H(si ).
gi (·) is derived from λii (·) and λij (·) as follows. First, for i = 1, 2 and for all
τi ∈ Ti = Σi , deﬁne a new function λdij : Ti → [∆(Σj × Tj )]H by letting
λdij,h (τi )({σj , σj }) = λij,h (τi )(σj )

∀σj ∈ Σj = Tj , h ∈ H

It is easy to verify that each λdij (τi ) is indeed a CPS.28
28 Let

Dj = {(σj , τj ) : τj = σj ∈ Σj }. Every λdij,h (τi ) is indeed a probability distribution
over Σj × Tj (in particular, probabilities add up to one along Dj ) which is concentrated
on Σj (h) × Tj (in particular, on the set {(σj , σj ) : σj ∈ Σj (h)}.) As for Bayes’ rule, for
Aj ⊂ Σj (h) × Tj ⊂ Σj (h ) × Tj , we have
λdij,h (Aj )

=

λij,h (projΣj (Aj ∩ Dj )) =

=

λij,h (projΣj (Aj ∩ Dj )) · λij,h (projΣj ((Σj (h) × Tj ) ∩ Dj )) =

=

λdij,h (Aj ) · λdij,h (Σj (h) × Tj ).


∈ Ak

=
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Next, for all τi ∈ Ti , let
gi (τi ) = λii (τi ) ⊗ λdij (τi )
Therefore, for every i and τi , gi (τi ) ∈ I∆H (Σi , Σj × Tj ). Thus we have a
well deﬁned type space, and in each state (i) beliefs are independent, (ii) at
any history, players are certain of their payoﬀ-type and (if possible) of their
strategy; ﬁnally, (iii) properties (i) and (ii) are common certainty at any point
in the game.
Moreover, for all h,
mrgΣj gi,h (τi ) = λij (τj ).
which immediately implies that, for i = 1, 2, σi∗ ∈ Σ∗i , σj ∈ Σj and τj ∈ Tj ,
1
(σi∗ , σj , σi∗ , τj ) ∈ Ri = Ri,F
.
1
n
That is, Σ∗i × Σj × Σ∗i × Tj ⊂ Ri,F
. Assume now that Σ∗i × Σj × Σ∗i × Tj ⊂ Ri,F
∗
for n ≥ 1 and i = 1, 2. Then, since βi,F is monotonic, and for any σi ∈ Σ∗i ,
mrgΣj ×Tj gi (σi∗ ) = λdij,h (σi∗ ) is concentrated on {(σj∗ , σj∗ ) : σj∗ ∈ Σ∗j } at all h ∈ F,
n
Σ∗i × Σj × Σ∗i × Tj ⊂ βi,F (Σi × Σ∗j × Ti × Σ∗j ) ⊂ βi,F (Rj,F
)
n+1
which implies Σ∗i × Σj × Σ∗i × Tj ⊂ Ri,F
. Hence, ∅ = Σ∗i × Σj × Σ∗i × Tj ⊂
n
n≥1 Ri,F = Ri ∩ CCORi,F for i = 1, 2, as required.
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